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INTRODUCTION 
Judicial Evaluations and Information Forcing: Ranking State 
High Courts and Their Judges (Judicial Evaluations),1 by Professors 
Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric Posner is an important effort to 
create and apply an objective methodology for evaluating the relative 
quality of state supreme courts. The article follows a previous work 
by Professors Choi and Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court 
Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance (Choosing the 
Next Supreme Court Justice),2 which employed a similar methodology 
to evaluate the quality of federal appeals court judges.3 
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 1. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and Information 
Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L. J. 1313 (2009). 
 2. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An 
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & 
Gulati, Choosing the Next]; see also Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 
CAL. L. REV. 299, 299–304 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?] 
(proposing a system to evaluate federal judges).  
 3. For additional perspectives on judicial performance by Professors Choi, Gulati, and 
Posner, see generally Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking the 
Statistics, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19 (2005) (examining the background reasons for Judge 
Posner’s high performance on rankings); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Essay, Ranking 
Judges According to Citation Bias (As a Means to Reduce Bias), 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1279 
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Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner consistently advance the 
theme that judicial rankings are here to stay.4 They contend that it is 
important to develop an objectively neutral rankings system for two 
reasons. First, an objective rankings system will offer significant 
insights into judicial performance precisely because it is transparent 
and replicable. Second, an objectively neutral methodology will 
counter other evaluation systems that are more designed to reflect the 
agendas of the evaluators than the quality of the judges studied. 
We generally agree with Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner with 
respect to these central assertions. Judicial rankings, for better or 
worse, are not going away. Therefore, there is a strong need to 
develop meaningful and appropriate measures for evaluation. We 
also agree with the authors that developing objective criteria, if 
possible, can unmask and refute the efforts of interest groups and 
politicians to manipulate standards to further their own agendas. 
The Choi, Gulati, and Posner approach is straightforward: (1) 
identify attributes of judicial quality that are value neutral and 
uncontestable, (2) find objectively measurable proxies that correlate 
with those attributes, and (3) rank state courts according to the 
proxies. The judicial attributes Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner 
select are productivity, influence, and independence. The measurable 
proxies are the number of opinions written by state courts, the 
amount of out-of-state citations to those opinions, and instances of 
disagreement among judges of the same political stripe. The study 
suggests that to the extent that these proxies measure uncontestable 
attributes of good judges and good courts, the rankings should reflect 
relative judicial quality. Equally important, the rankings should 
motivate judges and courts to improve their ranking by improving 
their performance with respect to the underlying attributes. 
That said, we have a number of concerns with the authors’ 
approach. To initially illustrate these concerns, consider the following 
example. Suppose one wants to rank seafood restaurants. 
Convenience is at least one important attribute in a restaurant, and 
one possible proxy for convenience might be the distance of the 
seafood place from the closest highway exit ramp. One might 
 
(2007) (proposing a ranking system to make judicial bias more transparent); Stephen J. Choi & 
G. Mitu Gulati, Essay, Which Judges Write Their Opinions (And Should We Care?), 32 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 1077, 1079–96 (2005) (discussing the desirability of addressing issues of authorship 
and delegation in federal court opinions). 
 4. See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1364. 
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therefore develop a restaurant quality index based on the ramp-to-
entrance distance in which restaurants closer to a ramp are ranked 
higher than those farther away. But how effective would this ranking 
actually be in determining restaurant quality? 
First, the ranking on its own provides little meaningful 
information if convenience is much less important to customers than 
other attributes. It tells nothing, for example, about the quality of the 
food, the friendliness of the service, or the cleanliness of the facility. 
Second, if the proxy—ramp-to-entrance—is a small part of what it 
means to be convenient, the ranking does not even tell one much 
about convenience. Customers, after all, might find larger parking lots 
to be of more convenience than highway proximity. Finally, because a 
ranking encourages its subjects to take actions to increase their 
scores, this convenience ranking might lead a restaurant to move 
closer to a highway rather than take more important actions such as 
improving the quality of its food, hiring friendlier employees, working 
on its cleanliness, or increasing the size of its parking lot. 
These same concerns come into play in the Choi, Gulati, and 
Posner study. Similar to the choice of convenience in the restaurant 
ranking described above, we strongly suspect that the attributes that 
the authors select in Judicial Rankings constitute relatively minor 
aspects of judicial quality. Those who care about state supreme courts 
may not be all that concerned about productivity, influence, or 
independence. Rather, observers may care more about whether 
judges have a particular ideology or judicial philosophy, whether they 
vote certain ways in hot button cases, whether they are fair, whether 
they present their legal opinions clearly and address opposing 
arguments, whether they possess a sound judicial temperament, 
whether they have unquestioned integrity, whether they treat lawyers 
respectfully, and whether they have outstanding reputations as jurists 
in their communities. These factors (with the exception of ideology 
and voting patterns) are undoubtedly hard, perhaps impossible, to 
quantify. And many of these factors, unlike the ones relied on by 
Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner, cannot be culled from Westlaw 
or Lexis. Nonetheless, in deciding what is a high-quality court, the 
Choi, Gulati, and Posner study—and the presumption it generates—
elevates measurable over nonmeasurable attributes without regard to 
their relative importance.5 
 
 5. The authors’ response to these concerns is that the presumptive marker of judicial 
quality created by the ranking encourages parties to convey other useful information in an effort 
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Second, even if judicial productivity, influence, and 
independence are central to evaluating judicial quality, it is not at all 
clear that the authors’ methodology accurately captures performance 
in these areas. That is to say, the correlation between the proxy and 
the attribute might not be that high. Does the number of published 
opinions, for example, really reflect judicial productivity? Or are 
there other more important factors involved, such as the total number 
of cases reviewed, the time a court takes between hearing and 
resolving a matter, or the effort the court devotes to judicial 
administration and supervision? If so, then, the single proxy they have 
chosen does not offer much more information about judicial 
productivity than distance from the highway offers about the 
convenience of restaurants in a world in which people care more 
about parking or hours of operation. 
Third, in the same way that we are wary of a restaurant rankings 
system that only encourages restaurants to move closer to a highway, 
so are we concerned with the incentives for judicial behavior created 
by the Choi, Gulati, and Posner rankings. Evaluation systems 
encourage their subjects to engage in activity to improve their 
rankings.6 Indeed, rankings, as will be discussed, are beneficial when 
they encourage aspects of judicial behavior that should be rewarded 
and penalize aspects of judicial behavior that should be discouraged.7 
But one must be confident in the correlation between the proxy and 
the attribute for the ranking to serve a salutary purpose. It is not clear 
that motivating judges to write more opinions, to work to have their 
opinions more frequently cited, or to disagree with judges of the same 
political party would increase the overall quality of state courts—
particularly when those actions may require the judges to forego 
other activities that may be more important to the administration of 
justice.8 For example, judges striving to improve their productivity 
 
to combat the presumption. But, as we will discuss infra Part II.B, that will be hard to do. A 
seafood restaurant, for example, grappling with a low convenience ranking would have to post 
flyers about the quality of the fish or the ambience of its dining room. These unverifiable claims 
about immeasurable quality attributes look self-serving and will be unlikely to ever dislodge the 
initial ranking presumption. 
 6. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of 
Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 630 (2000) (discussing the role of reputation in 
influencing judicial behavior). 
 7. See infra Part II.C. 
 8. The authors readily concede this point. See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1318 (citing 
Steven Kerr, On the Folly of Rewarding A While Hoping for B, 18 ACAD. MGMT. J. 769, 778 
(1975)). 
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score by writing more opinions might shirk on other productive 
responsibilities such as court administration, careful consideration of 
the merits of each case, or a close reading of the trial record. 
We therefore raise the possibility that the Choi, Gulati, and 
Posner study may serve to weaken rather than improve judicial 
performance. Again, we do not suggest that rankings systems are 
necessarily bad because they may prospectively affect judicial 
behavior. The key, however, is creating a metric that leads to 
beneficial results, and we are concerned that the particular criteria 
used in Judicial Evaluations are not so finely calibrated. 
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I addresses the threshold 
question of whether ranking state supreme courts is valuable. 
Assuming that there is value in the project, Part II looks at alternative 
measures for evaluating the performance of state courts, juxtaposing 
those measures with the indices of productivity, influence, and 
independence used by Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner. Part III 
examines the Choi, Gulati, and Posner study in detail. It first 
questions whether, in creating a presumptive marker of judicial 
quality, the authors miss something by focusing on productivity, 
influence, and independence. Part III then discusses some of the 
methodological problems with the selected proxies. Part IV suggests 
an alternative lens of judicial evaluation that might lead to more 
beneficial results. 
I.  WHY RANK STATE SUPREME COURTS? 
Prior to the Choi, Gulati, and Posner study, the most prominent 
rankings of state supreme courts were those issued by the United 
States Chamber of Commerce (Chamber).9 The Chamber surveys 
lawyers and asks them to evaluate the judicial impartiality, the 
judicial competence, and the overall quality of state courts. The 
rankings reward those courts that leading business lawyers perceive 
as friendly to business.10 
The immediate positive result of Judicial Evaluations is that it 
provides a counterbalance to the Chamber by demonstrating that a 
high probusiness ranking does not equate to a high, objective quality 
ranking. This contribution is not to be undervalued. One use of any 
 
 9. See, e.g., HARRIS INTERACTIVE, INC., 2008 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE STATE 
LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY (2008), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/ 
Superior%20Court/pdf/?harris_2008.pdf. 
 10. Id. at 20 tbl.7. 
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judicial rankings system is political spin. As Professors Choi and 
Gulati noted in their previous work, political actors consistently claim 
that the judges they support are of the highest caliber and quality,11 
and they will no doubt be quick to cite a ranking system that supports 
their claim if at all possible.12 Accordingly, it is also unsurprising that 
rankings have also been used in debates over judicial salaries and 
resources.13 Indeed because of their “ease of transmission and 
understandability,”14 ranking systems have particularly powerful 
resonance in the public mind.15 For this reason alone, offering an 
objective alternative to the Chamber’s agenda-driven ranking system 
is invaluable. 
Beyond providing a weapon in the spin wars, however, the 
benefits of ranking state supreme courts are not obvious.16 For 
example, although the project of ranking federal appeals court judges 
may make some sense as a method for determining the relative merit 
of particular judges competing for a United States Supreme Court 
nomination,17 the same rationale does not apply to comparing the 
relative merits of state supreme courts. After all, seats on the United 
States Supreme Court are filled by individuals, not full courts.18  
Nor does ranking state supreme courts accomplish the same 
function as ranking institutions such as colleges, professional schools, 
 
 11. Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next, supra note 2, at 39 n.29. 
 12. To be sure, politicians might shy away from using a ranking system that may be seen as 
too controversial or otherwise inconsistent with their agenda. A conservative, for example, 
would likely not be inclined to cite a high ranking from the American Civil Liberties Union as 
favorable evidence of a judge’s merit. 
 13. See Letter from Robert D. Ray, Iowa Judicial Comp. Task Force, to Nicholas Critelli, 
President, Iowa State Bar Ass’n (Apr. 18, 2005), available at http://www.iowabar.org/misc 
documents.nsf/2b85a4ea12f4bfac8625669d006e27ab/f0fb92e322a9987d86256ff20049a0bb/$FILE/
Judicial%20compensation.pdf (cited in Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1316 n.2). 
 14. Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next, supra note 2, at 39 n.29. 
 15. See, e.g., Press Release, Univ. of Iowa News Serv., Study by UI Sociologist Shows Law 
School Rankings Affect Student Decisions (Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.newsreleases.uiowa.edu/ 
2006/march/030106law_study.html. 
 16. One reason for rankings suggested by the authors is to establish bragging rights. Choi et 
al., supra note 1, at 1316–17. Perhaps a ranking system could be justified on that count alone. 
But we are skeptical. The more likely uses of rankings are to (1) further policy or political 
agendas or (2) decide on the allocation of resources to the court. 
 17. See Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next, supra note 2, at 25–32. 
 18. Rankings, of course, could be used to compare the relative merits of state supreme 
court judges but that would require individual rankings and not a ranking of the court as a 
whole. In this respect, it is notable that Judicial Evaluation does not rank all individual state 
court judges. See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1360. Instead, it identifies judges that score 
particularly well on certain measures. See id. at 1361 tbl.14. 
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or hospitals.19 Those rankings influence the choices of prospective 
patients, students, and faculty to affiliate with a particular 
institution.20 The only equivalent of “applicants” to state supreme 
courts are litigants. The aspect of judicial reputation of most interest 
to the litigant, however, is the court’s sympathies for, or against, their 
legal position—not whether that state’s supreme court is considered 
by some measures to be objectively excellent.21 
Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner suggest that ranking state 
courts may assist individuals or entities that have an interest in the 
influence of out-of-state courts. They claim that rankings may be 
useful to individuals or entities who are affected by out-of-state 
supreme court decisions because those parties then may have reason 
to try to affect judicial composition in the highly ranked (and 
therefore ostensibly more influential) states or they may want to 
submit amicus briefs to influence the development of the law in those 
states.22  
They further contend that lawyers, academics, and others who 
conduct legal research may be especially interested in knowing which 
court systems are seen as producing the best judicial opinions so they 
can determine the best examples of legal reasoning.23 Finally, they 
might suggest in this same vein that rankings could be beneficial 
because a court in one state might follow a precedent from a highly 
rated out-of-state supreme court over a decision of a lesser-ranked 
state supreme court. 
But these effects are likely to be marginal at best. The interests 
of individuals or entities in out-of-state proceedings are likely to be 
issue-dependent, not generic. For example, although labor law 
 
 19. See Special Report: America’s Best Graduate Schools: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Apr. 7–14, 2008, at 46, 46; Special Report: America’s Best Graduate Schools: 
Schools of Medicine, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 7–14, 2008, at 36, 36–38; U.S. News & 
World Report, America’s Best Hospitals, http://health.usnews.com/sections/health/best-
hospitals/index.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2009). 
 20. See, e.g., Michael Sauder & Ryon Lancaster, Do Rankings Matter? The Effects of U.S. 
News & World Report Rankings on the Admissions Processes of Law Schools, 40 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 105, 105 (2006) (finding that the U.S. News & World Report rankings “have significant 
effects on both the decisions of prospective students and the decisions schools make in the 
admissions process”). 
 21. For a discussion on the tendency of partisan elected state court judges to redistribute 
wealth from out-of-state defendants, see Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Effect of 
Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 341, 341 (2002). “[D]ifferences in 
awards are caused by differences in electoral systems, not by differences in state law.” Id. 
 22. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1317–18. 
 23. Id. 
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practitioners in one state may want to influence the development of 
labor law in another state, it is unlikely that they will have enough 
interest in that state’s legal system to also seek to influence that 
state’s law in other substantive areas. Likewise, legal researchers are 
likely to focus on cases in their substantive areas rather than on the 
reputations of out-of-state courts in general. They will normally 
investigate significant cases in their area of interest, regardless of 
jurisdiction, and will not artificially confine their inquiries to highly 
ranked judicial systems. Finally, a state supreme court seeking 
support for its holdings from another jurisdiction will be far more 
likely to be interested in the result of the case it cites than in the 
reputation of the court that decides it.24 Indeed it is hard to believe 
that a court faced with conflicting decisions from two different courts 
would decide to follow one solely because the issuing court has a 
superior reputation. 
There is one area, however, in which the impact of judicial 
rankings may be understated. Judicial rankings do not merely reflect 
past performance of a judge or a court system—they might also create 
incentives for a judge or court to take actions to improve their score.25 
If the ranking is used by the appointing authority—voters or 
governors—to grade court performance, scoring well on the ranking 
system will lead to job security and maybe even more resources.26 
And even if there are no tangible benefits to higher rankings, judges 
may seek to score better in a ranking system simply because they 
believe it will help improve their reputation and stature.27 
Accordingly, one reason to rank judges or courts would be to 
influence behavior. As such, the stakes in judicial rankings are high 
and the importance of getting it right and developing a system that 
serves to encourage appropriate judicial behavior is manifest. The 
 
 24. Contrast this with the reputation of the judge who wrote the cited case. Sometimes, an 
opinion will delineate which judge wrote the cited opinion to give the citation more authority. 
This is especially true if a famous and influential judge wrote the opinion. See David Klein & 
Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 
28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 371 (1999) (discussing the invocation of judges’ names in citations of 
court opinions). 
 25. Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner recognize this. Indeed, it is one reason they 
developed their ranking system. Choi & Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, supra note 2, at 313–
15. 
 26. In the competition for state dollars, courts might spin rankings a number of ways. A 
low-ranking court might attribute their rank or status to a lack of resources. A high-ranking 
court might claim that they deserve more money precisely because they are so excellent. 
 27. See Schauer, supra note 6, at 627–31. 
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question of whether the ranking system developed by Professors 
Choi, Gulati, and Posner actually correlates to the estimable qualities 
of a judge or a court is therefore of considerable consequence. 
II.  MEASURING JUDICIAL QUALITY 
The question of what makes a good judge depends in no small 
part on who is asking. To the Chamber, the question is easy—a judge 
that lawyers perceive advance a probusiness agenda. Likewise, the 
Sierra Club presumably considers a good judge to be one whose 
opinions support environmental interests; organized labor considers a 
good judge to be one whose jurisprudence furthers workers’ rights; 
and the American Medical Association considers a good judge to be 
one whose decisions limit tort awards for malpractice and otherwise 
demonstrate solicitude for the concerns of physicians and other 
medical professionals. 
To a practicing attorney, the answer may be something different. 
No doubt any attorney would be delighted to appear before a judge 
who, for ideological reasons, is predisposed to rule in his favor. But 
we are not convinced that all lawyers are so obsessively self-interested 
that they would believe that simply because a judge might rule for 
that lawyer’s side, that judge is thereby excellent. Moreover, in many, 
if not most, cases ideology does not come into play.28 Thus, we suspect 
that practicing lawyers would most value judges who are impartial, 
clear, open-minded, fair, experienced, timely, and even-keeled in 
judicial temperament.29 
The academic or expert observer, in turn, may be more focused 
on qualities such as vision, creativity, writing quality, and scholarly 
impact. Concededly, academics or experts may be influenced in their 
appraisal by agreement with the judge on key issues, but they will also 
be attuned to the judge’s knowledge of the law, ability to anticipate 
the implications of the judge’s decisions, and intellectual honesty in 
addressing opposing arguments. When Michael W. McConnell, a 
prominent conservative, was nominated to the Tenth Circuit by 
President George W. Bush, for example, he was supported by over a 
 
 28. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 27–28 (2008). 
 29. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 cmt. 1 (2007) (calling for judges to 
serve with impartiality, fairness, and to be “objective and open-minded”); id. 2.5 cmts. 1–4 
(instructing judges to perform duties competently and diligently; to be efficient, punctual, and 
prepared; and to avoid any “unnecessary cost or delay”). 
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hundred legal scholars, including some of the most liberal academics 
in the country, because of the strength of his scholarly contributions.30 
A president or governor, on the other hand, may view judicial 
quality in still another light. The president or governor wants to 
appoint a judge who shares a similar legal vision and who will use the 
judicial role to advance the appointing agent’s political agenda.31 Yet, 
the president or governor will also be alert to other factors such as 
ethnic and geographic diversity and support from key constituencies 
or political actors. More to the point for our purposes, the president 
or governor is also likely, for both short-term and long-term reasons, 
to want to appoint a jurist with high stature, meaning a reputation for 
excellence among people of all political stripes. In the short term, the 
appointment of a highly regarded jurist will improve the president or 
the governor’s own political capital as the choice will be seen as 
motivated by merit rather than politics. Further, establishing a 
pattern of appointing highly regarded jurists may make for a 
smoother confirmation of the president or governor’s subsequent 
judicial nominees as an established track record of reputable 
appointments means that each additional appointment might be 
subject to less scrutiny.32 
Similarly, the president or governor will also have strong long-
term interests at stake in nominating persons of stature. Appointing 
governors or presidents will be interested in seating well-reputed 
judges to establish their own legacy as someone who took 
nominations powers seriously and worked to favorably influence the 
administration of justice. The president or governor may also want to 
appoint a jurist who has the vision and the ability to influence the law 
for future generations. 
 
 30. Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 707–35 (2002). 
 31. Attitudinalists might suggest that appointing someone sharing a similar legal vision is 
simply an attempt to achieve favorable political results through judicial decisions. But the 
equation is more complicated. A conservative governor, for example, is likely to choose to 
appoint a conservative judge over a liberal candidate because they think the conservative judge 
is right on the law. Conservative governors, then, choose judges based on what they believe to 
be merit; the potential to obtain favorable political results through judicial decisionmaking is 
not, in effect, anything more than a welcome by-product. 
 32. This is not to say that a president or governor will never appoint a judge because of 
immediate political concerns. President George W. Bush, for example, may have nominated 
Harriet Miers to the United States Supreme Court because he was particularly interested in 
having a judge who strongly supported his positions on expansive presidential power. 
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The ranking system set forth by Professors Choi, Gulati, and 
Posner neither looks at case results nor reputation in defining what 
constitutes a good court.33 They dismiss the former as inserting the 
political component that an objective evaluation is designed to avoid34 
and they dismiss the latter because determining judicial reputation 
would inevitably require surveying “experts” such as law professors 
or bar organizations who may use surveys to advance their own 
political agendas.35 Rather, the authors’ rankings look solely to who 
scores well on the chosen proxies for productivity, influence, and 
independence. And although the authors, to be sure, are aware that 
reliance on these factors alone may omit other important aspects of 
judicial behavior,36 their ranking system, in the end, weighs only these 
three proxies. 
We agree with the authors’ conclusion that neither interest 
groups nor expert rankings provide objective assessments of judicial 
performance. We are concerned, however, that the factors measured 
in Judicial Evaluations are too narrow to be granted the presumptive 
weight the authors suggest. Given the potential real-world impact of 
this ranking system, it becomes necessary to investigate whether the 
rankings in Judicial Evaluations actually work to reflect (and 
promote) judicial quality. We turn to this task in the next Section. 
III.  THE CHOI, GULATI, AND POSNER MEASURES 
It is not our purpose to raise every conceivable objection to the 
methodology employed by the authors in Judicial Evaluations. 
Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner are refreshingly candid in 
 
 33. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1320–26. 
 34. Id. at 1315–16 (“Because of the difficulty of identifying the principal’s preferences, we 
cannot very easily evaluate judges on the basis of case outcomes.”). 
 35. Many scholars have critiqued the ABA’s ratings of judicial nominees. See, e.g., Bruce 
Fein, Let’s Lower the ABA from Its Pedestal, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 14, 1992, at 28; see also James 
Lindgren, Examining the American Bar Association’s Ratings of Nominees to the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for Political Bias, 1989–2000, 17 J.L. & POL. 1, 2 (2001) (“In recent years, the ABA’s 
role in rating judges has become increasingly controversial . . . .”); Laura E. Little, The ABA’s 
Role in Prescreening Federal Judicial Candidates: Are We Ready to Give up on the Lawyers?, 10 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 37, 37–39 (2001) (“The ABA’s explicitly controversial positions have 
surely contributed to its public relations problems and have magnified suspicions that the ABA 
uses judicial evaluations to implement policy objectives under the whitewash of ‘judicial 
fitness.’”); William G. Ross, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: A Search for a Synthesis, 
57 ALB. L. REV. 993, 1026 (1994) (“The perception . . . has inspired criticisms of its prominent 
role in the appointment process.”). 
 36. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1320–26. 
MARSHALL CGP IN FINAL2.DOC 5/5/2009  4:14:31 PM 
1656 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1645 
recognizing potential methodological objections to their study and 
they have been remarkably creative in striving to control for state-
specific factors in compiling their results. Rather, our intent is to 
critique Judicial Evaluations with a broader brush. Specifically we ask 
three deliberately broad questions: (1) do the measures of 
productivity, influence, and independence accurately assess judicial 
quality; (2) does the data collected in the study create meaningful 
proxies for these qualities; and (3) does ranking based on 
performance on these measures encourage beneficial judicial 
behavior? 
A.  Do Productivity, Influence, and Independence Reflect Judicial 
Quality? 
Although it obviously depends on how they are defined and 
measured, we assume that productivity, influence, and independence 
are positive judicial qualities. We suggest, however, that assessing 
judicial quality by measuring these factors may not be particularly 
fruitful and, perhaps, may be counterproductive. 
Consider, for example, what types of judicial decisionmaking are 
not captured by the study’s measures. As the authors acknowledge, 
their study does not measure whether courts or judges decide cases 
on the basis of policy preferences, although the authors themselves 
suggest that deciding cases in that way is improper.37 Similarly, the 
study does not pick up judicial corruption or malfeasance.38 Nor does 
their study, in examining productivity, influence, and independence 
alone, uncover the judicial behavior discussed in Professors Thomas 
Brennan, Lee Epstein, and Nancy Staudt’s contribution to this 
Symposium. That study suggests that judges at times act like voters 
and punish or reward the government based on economic conditions 
that may be extraneous to the legal issues before them.39 Therefore, 
we wonder whether Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner’s study can 
grant a presumptive marker of excellence or high quality if it allows a 
court to maintain a high ranking even when its members decide cases 
or behave in ways that the authors and most observers acknowledge 
 
 37. Id. at 1325. 
 38. Id. (discussing the fact that the study does not pick up instances of bribery). 
 39. See Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein & Nancy Staudt, Economic Trends and Judicial 
Outcomes: A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1194 (2009). 
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are inappropriate.40 Equally significant, because of data limitations, 
their study ignores aspects of judicial behavior that are arguably more 
important than the ones proxied, such as integrity, fairness, open-
mindedness, thoroughness, and temperament. And it neglects the 
contributions to the law that judges may make outside opinion 
writing, including judicial administration and lower court supervision, 
serving on government commissions, teaching at law schools, writing 
scholarly articles, and training other judges. The data can only 
provide so much information. 
Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner, of course, recognize this 
criticism and readily acknowledge that their measures “capture some, 
but not all, aspects of judicial quality.”41 But they do not concede that 
it is therefore misleading to focus rankings solely on their 
performance measures. As noted, they argue that their rankings, 
although not definitively capturing judicial quality, at least create a 
presumption that courts that do well on their scores are superior to 
those that do not. They state, “It would be a mistake to believe that 
small differences in measured outcomes reflect significant differences 
in quality. But where the differences are large, it is likely that the 
lower-ranked judges or courts are inferior, unless a good reason exists 
to explain the difference.”42 We are not convinced. If productivity, 
influence, and independence represent only a narrow range on the list 
of attributes that constitute a good judge or court, then creating a 
presumption that a court that scores well on these factors is a high 
quality court may be a classic example of the tail wagging the dog. 
The authors strive to avoid this criticism by, in effect, 
understating the impact of their work. They contend that because 
their study only seeks to establish a presumption of judicial quality 
rather than a full measure, anyone who disagrees with their results 
can simply come forward and explain why a court that fares relatively 
poorly on their measures should otherwise be deemed a quality court. 
To the authors, the import of their study is in its effect as an 
 
 40. It might be argued that if a court’s decisions are too politically based they will not be 
cited outside of that court’s jurisdiction and would therefore fare poorly on the influence 
measure. That would only be true, however, if other courts were also not being swayed by 
political concerns. 
 41. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1319. 
 42. Id. at 1319–20. 
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“information-forcing” device.43 The political power inherent in 
rankings, however, is not that nuanced. A claim by a court’s defender 
that the results of a purportedly objective study should be discounted 
because that court has chosen to devote its energies toward activities 
that are outside the objective measures or that the court did not do 
well in relation to other courts because of the idiosyncratic nature of 
its caseload would have little political resonance and would simply 
sound defensive. Similarly, because the public has little or no basis for 
distinguishing between true and false claims about nonquantifiable 
factors as reputation, stature, fairness, and judicial temperament, any 
claim by a court’s defender arguing that the court’s poor performance 
on the study’s rankings is outweighed by its excellence in these other 
areas would sound hollow. 
The compelling information in this political dialogue and the 
information that, in Professors Choi and Gulati’s words, has the “ease 
of transmission and understandability,”44 is the ranking number and 
not the long excusatory explanation that follows. The study’s 
objective rankings, in short, create a hard presumption that would be 
extraordinarily difficult to rebut. 
To all of this, one other important factor should be added. The 
claim that the chosen proxies for productivity, influence, and 
independence should presumptively trump other judicial qualities 
requires, at the least, that those proxies are precisely measured. But 
whether Judicial Evaluations accurately gleans productivity, 
influence, and independence is a matter to which we now turn. 
B.  Does the Data Collected in Judicial Evaluations Accurately 
Capture and Compare Productivity, Influence, and Independence? 
1. Productivity. Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner purport to 
capture productivity by counting the number of opinions issued by 
each state supreme court. But whether the number of published 
opinions should be equated to productivity depends in large part on 
what goals the productivity measure is designed to serve.45 The 
 
 43. For a general discussion of the value of information-forcing devices, see Scott Baker, 
Mitu Gulati & Stephen Choi, The Rat Race as an Information-Forcing Device, 81 IND. L.J. 53, 78 
(2006). 
 44. Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next, supra note 2, at 39 n.29. 
 45. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Supreme Court Selection and Measures of Past Judicial 
Performance, 32 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 1175, 1177–78 (2005) (suggesting that the productivity 
measure does not clearly measure beneficial judicial behavior). 
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authors argue that productivity is an important measure of judicial 
quality because it reflects whether the courts are fulfilling their 
obligation to resolve cases.46 But, in fact, as the authors acknowledge, 
the relationship between publishing opinions and resolving cases is 
not immediately apparent. Courts also resolve cases by issuing 
unpublished opinions. Yet the authors do not credit these forms of 
case disposition in their opinion counting, claiming that because 
unpublished opinions are written by secondary personnel they do not 
reflect the work of the court itself.47 Why not? If what is being 
rewarded by the productivity measure is the court’s actions in 
deciding cases, it should not matter how those cases are resolved. 
The authors also defend the published opinions proxy on the 
ground that written opinions allow judges to share their reasoning 
with the parties and other judges thereby bettering the system of 
justice.48 But more opinions do not necessarily lead to a better 
jurisprudence. Multiple decisions on the same subject can often serve 
to convolute, rather than clarify, legal rules.49 Authoring a single 
opinion that provides a clear rule of decision may therefore be a more 
productive use of judicial resources than writing multiple decisions on 
the same subject. 
Further, judges are productive in a variety of ways other than 
merely increasing the quantity of opinions that they publish. In 
addition to issuing unpublished opinions, courts may also devote 
considerable time and resources to reading lengthy trial records, to 
reforming judicial rules and practices, to supervising the state’s lower 
courts, to writing scholarly articles, to training new judges, to 
facilitating settlements, and to serving on government commissions. 
None of these efforts are captured by the study’s productivity proxy. 
 
 46. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1320–21. 
 47. Id. Presumably, the authors do not value productivity merely as a surrogate for hard 
work. Hard work may be an admirable trait but it should not be relevant to a ranking system 
unless it leads to results that benefit overall judicial quality. In any case, quantity of production 
does not always equate to individual effort. A judge, after all, may work just as hard as another 
but, for a variety of reasons, not be able to produce as much written work. 
 48. Id. at 1321. 
 49. See, e.g., Kirt Shuldberg, Digital Influence: Technology and Unpublished Opinions in 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 CAL. L. REV. 541, 547–49 (1997) (describing research costs 
and judicial efficiency as rationales for not publishing all opinions); see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1964, at 11 (1964) (recommending for the first time that opinions 
be published only in cases “which are of general precedential value”). 
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Finally, relying solely on the number of published opinions 
ignores other key (and perhaps competing) proxies, such as timeliness 
in deciding cases, that also reflect a court’s productivity. Consider two 
courts. In a given year, Court A hears 300 cases. It writes opinions in 
150 cases, with each opinion taking, on average, 100 days to formulate 
and decides the other 150 by unpublished decisions, which take, on 
average, 30 days each to formulate. Court B, in turn, hears 300 cases, 
writes 50 opinions, and decides the other 250 cases by unpublished 
decision. Which court is more productive? Court A writes more 
opinions; so the authors’ study would give that court a higher rating. 
But Court B’s speed of case disposition is much faster.50 Given the 
importance of timeliness to the administration of justice,51 why should 
not Court B be considered the more productive court?52 
2. Influence.  The influence proxy employed by Professors Choi, 
Gulati, and Posner is also problematic. Whether citation counts 
generally measure influence or opinion quality has been the subject of 
much debate, and we need not review that literature here.53 Even if 
citation counts do shed some light on influence or quality, however, 
they are just part of the picture. There is much more to opinion 
quality than the number of judicial citations an opinion generates. A 
landmark opinion in a relatively narrow area of law, for example, may 
be cited less than a mediocre opinion in a frequently litigated 
substantive area simply because there are fewer opinions generated in 
that area.54 Or a court may write a groundbreaking opinion adopting a 
minority approach to a legal issue; but that opinion will not yield 
many citations if other states decide not to adopt the minority 
approach. 
 
 50. On average Court B decides each case in 41.6 days; on average Court A decides each 
case in 65 days.  
 51. We are reminded of the adage “Justice delayed is justice denied,” often attributed to 
William Gladstone and made famous as a plea to courts to be efficient to administer justice 
properly. See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, In Memoriam: Judge Donald P. Lay, 92 IOWA L. REV. 
1551, 1585 (2007) (praising Judge Lay’s speed and effectiveness in resolving cases). 
 52. Indeed, one of the problems inherent in the authors’ use of published opinions as a 
proxy for productivity is that it discourages courts from issuing decisions quickly because writing 
opinions takes more time. 
 53. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383, 
1391–93 (2009); William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: 
A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 272–75 (1998). 
 54. See Cross & Lindquist, supra note 53, at 1392 (“[S]ome types of cases are simply more 
common and therefore more likely to receive citations than other types of cases.”). 
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Further, there are particularly strong reasons to question the use 
of citation count for its accuracy in comparing influence or quality 
across state systems. To begin with, we suspect that citations to out-
of-state courts are likely to come from the lawyers in the case, not 
from in-state judges persuaded by the power of the reasoning of their 
out-of-state colleagues. And, needless to say, the reasons that lawyers 
cite out-of-state cases are also not primarily related to the strength of 
the court’s reasoning. They choose to cite cases because they 
welcome virtually any authority that supports their legal position. 
Finally, high citation counts may be attributable to developments 
in law unrelated to the strength of the judiciary. Citations to out-of-
state courts frequently occur when there is no case law on point in the 
home jurisdiction, that is, when the legal issue in dispute is a matter of 
first impression. This inevitably favors courts with innovative 
legislatures, litigants, or state executives because those entities are 
likely to trigger first-impression litigation and courts that rule first in 
an area are likely to be more frequently cited, whether or not the 
opinion itself is well reasoned. 
3. Independence.  A critical question regarding any independence 
measure is “Independence from what?” The authors’ study examines 
a judge’s independence by counting the number of times a judge 
writes an opinion in opposition to another judge of his own party. As 
one of us has previously argued, independence defined in this way 
may actually measure a lack of quality in judging, including 
deficiencies in collegiality and leadership, and a propensity for 
judicial activism outside the ideological mainstream.55 Further, 
dissenting opinions can also be harmful to the court’s general 
administration of justice as they require a court to spend more time 
and devote more resources to the case in question at the expense of 
other cases. 
Even more critically, the authors’ exclusive focus on intracourt 
voting behavior in assessing independence ignores the nature of state 
judicial selection processes. Unlike the federal court system in which 
the judges enjoy life tenure, state court judges are generally subject to 
reelection or reappointment and therefore need to have the political 
support of governors, political parties, and contributors. The real tests 
of a judge’s independence in the state courts, then, is more likely how 
 
 55. William P. Marshall, Be Careful What You Wish for: The Problems with Empirical 
Rankings to Select Supreme Court Justices, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 127–28 (2004). 
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the judge responds to the pressures from these interests.56 After all, it 
is governors, political parties, and contributors who, unlike fellow 
judges, have the ability to affect a judge’s tenure and retention on the 
bench. The authors’ study, however, does not measure how the judge 
votes in relation to positions of these entities. As such, the authors’ 
proxy of counting the number of opinions a judge writes in opposition 
to judges of their own party may not provide much insight into 
judicial independence at the state court level.57 
C.  Do the Authors’ Measures of Productivity, Influence, and 
Independence Encourage Salutary Judicial Behavior? 
As noted previously, ranking systems inevitably encourage their 
subjects to engage in behavior that increases their scores. Thus, 
Judicial Evaluations needs to be examined in this context as well—do 
the measures used in the study encourage beneficial judicial 
behavior? That is, would the quality of state courts be improved if the 
courts issued more published opinions, worked to have their opinions 
more widely cited out of state, and had judges more frequently write 
opinions in opposition to others in their political party? 
Although we have no doubt that some judicial observers might 
believe that state court jurisprudence would be improved if judges 
responded to these incentives, we are skeptical that many would find 
that the major problems in state court jurisprudence are too few 
opinions, too few out-of-state court citations, or too few dissents. 
Rather, we suspect that observers would be more concerned that 
judges too readily insert their policy preferences into their 
decisions58or are too beholden to political and special interests.59 But 
as we have discussed, nothing in the authors’ study deters judges from 
improperly inserting their policy preferences into their judicial 
decisions or being unduly influenced by the policy agendas of their 
 
 56. See generally Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 
623 (2009) (demonstrating statistically that the views of donors and those who appoint judges 
affect judges’ voting decisions). 
 57. On this point, it is notable that the authors’ independence findings do not correlate 
with the Chamber surveys that ask lawyers to rate courts for judicial impartiality. See Choi et al., 
supra note 1, at 1355–59. 
 58. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection Versus Character, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 
659, 661 (2004); Lawrence B. Solum, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to 
Judicial Selection, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1741 (1988). 
 59. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics, and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of 
Arbitration Law in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 591–95 (2002) (explaining that interest 
groups may buy judge-made policy at the state level with campaign contributions). 
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political patrons, financial supporters, or reappointing agents.60 Nor 
do the incentives created by the authors’ measurements respond to 
other frequent criticisms of the courts, including inefficient judicial 
administration and long delays in deciding cases.61 Indeed, the study 
places a premium on writing more published opinions and dissents, 
which only exacerbates these problems. Thus, there is a significant 
question as to whether the ranking system in Judicial Evaluations also 
misses the mark by not creating a system of incentives that better 
captures the elements of what should be encouraged and discouraged 
in judicial behavior. 
IV.  CRAFTING A WIDER JUDICIAL RANKING LENS? 
The fact that some problems can be identified in the Judicial 
Evaluations methodology does not take any force away from its 
authors’ observation that judicial rankings are here to stay. Nor does 
it weaken their case that developing objective measures of judicial 
quality would be beneficial in providing counterweights to competing 
agenda-driven systems. It does suggest, however, that an alternative 
lens for evaluating judicial performance needs to be developed. 
The problem is that there are endemic weaknesses in any 
ranking system. Objective measures such as the one employed by 
Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner inevitably miss essential 
nonquantifiable aspects of judicial quality. The data are just not 
sufficiently rich. 
Expert evaluations are beset by their inherent subjectivity and 
susceptibility to ideological bias. Agenda-driven surveys such as that 
used by the Chamber do not, by definition, produce politically neutral 
results. 
We believe an ideal ranking system would serve two important 
functions. First, it would provide necessary counterweight to agenda-
driven rankings, ideologically tinged expert evaluations, and efforts to 
hide politically driven nominations behind claims of judicial 
excellence. Second, an ideal ranking system would provide incentives 
and disincentives for judicial behavior and accordingly would provide 
a potentially valuable tool for improving judicial performance. A 
 
 60. See Shepherd, supra note 56, at 629 (“[U]nder some retention methods, judges’ voting 
is associated with the political preferences of those who will decide whether the judges keep 
their jobs.”). 
 61. On the value of speedy courts, see supra note 51. 
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ranking system should, therefore, be adopted with these goals in 
mind. 
In this respect, we propose, perhaps counterintuitively, that a 
better way to further these goals would be to first encourage multiple 
interest groups to rank judges and then to examine who does well 
across a wide range of subjective rankings. Although any particular 
subjective evaluation may be unreliable, it may be possible to discern 
important attributes by comparing different subjective evaluations 
and taking into account the sources of those evaluations. If a court 
has performed well in the Chamber study standing alone, for 
example, this may simply reflect that commercial lawyers perceive 
that court to be probusiness. But if that court also scores well with 
organized labor, environmental organizations, and trial attorneys, the 
rankings take on a different light. They suggest instead that the 
court’s reputation derives from aspects of judicial performance that 
transcend politics and ideology, perhaps including qualities such as 
fairness, character, integrity, intellect, and efficiency. 
At the same time, if a court ranks well with only the groups on 
one side of the political spectrum, it sends precisely the opposite 
message. A court that scores well with only one type of interest group 
while earning failing marks from others is subject to the immediate 
criticism that the court is only a shill for the interest group that has 
evaluated it favorably. In this way, the fact that a court scores well 
with a particular interest group can effectively be turned into a 
political liability rather than an advantage. Multi-interest group 
rankings can therefore provide effective counterspin to single interest 
group rankings and provide counterweight to agenda-driven quality 
claims. 
Multi-interest group rankings also serve the goal of encouraging 
beneficial judicial behavior because a judge, to improve their overall 
rankings, will need to be favorably perceived across a broad spectrum 
of interests. This motivation should encourage the judge to be, among 
other things, fair, thoughtful, open-minded, tempered, and solicitous 
of opposing views—to be, in short, a better judge. 
To be sure, utilizing multi-interest group rankings is no panacea. 
It is not clear, for example, how the rankings of the varying interest 
groups should be solicited or cumulated, if at all. Nor is it 
immediately apparent how the groups whose rankings are to be 
considered in an overall appraisal should be identified. And any 
cumulative ranking system will also raise inevitable questions of 
balance. Does a cumulative ranking system that incorporates one 
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survey each from environmental, labor, consumer, and business 
interests reflect a balanced measure, or is it decidedly antibusiness 
because three of those four groups would not be expected to be 
particularly sensitive to business concerns? 
Finally, a multi-interest group approach may also invite strategic 
behavior. A liberal group may very well believe certain conservative 
jurists are excellent judges, for example, but nevertheless give them 
low scores to weaken those judges’ candidacy for judicial promotion. 
Indeed, to the extent ratings are used in selecting Supreme Court 
Justices, as Professors Choi and Gulati suggested in an earlier article, 
strategic behavior of this type might quickly become the norm. 
Nevertheless, we believe that expanding the field of avowedly 
subjective judicial rankings may be a more effective mechanism for 
evaluating judicial quality and for promoting beneficial judicial 
behavior than a measure that too narrowly focuses on uncontestable 
objective factors. And given that judicial rankings, for better or 
worse, are unlikely to disappear, multigroup rankings may be the only 
effective way to counter the political agendas of interest groups acting 
on their own. 
CONCLUSION 
In their project, Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner tackle a 
difficult task: ranking the state supreme courts on objective measures 
for which data is readily available. They employ a transparent and 
easy to understand methodology, attempting to measure judicial 
productivity by counting a court’s number of published opinions, 
judicial influence by counting out-of-state court citations, and judicial 
independence by counting the number of opinions a judge writes in 
opposition to another judge of her own political party. Recognizing 
that productivity, influence, and independence alone do not fully 
capture judicial quality, they suggest that performance on these 
measures should set a presumption of judicial excellence that can be 
rebutted by the inclusion of additional information to explain the 
results. The rankings, as they see it, serve both to provide an initial 
insight into judicial quality and an information-forcing device for 
more complete appraisals. 
Our response to the project is not the obvious one: Quality 
cannot be measured so do not even try to grade the state courts. 
Rather, recognizing, as the authors do, that, like it or not, judicial 
rankings are here to stay, we pose a series of questions. 
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Do most observers really care about productivity, influence, and 
independence when it comes to state supreme courts? Or do they 
care more about traits in judges that cannot be objectively measured 
such as fairness and judicial temperament? 
Even if observers do care about productivity, influence, or 
independence, does scoring well on the proxies used by the authors in 
measuring these qualities accurately measure excellence in the 
attributes themselves? After all, the authors use only one proxy for 
each attribute considered. Is the number of published opinions alone, 
for example, an effective proxy for judicial productivity? Or would 
using more proxies provide a better measure? 
Can the presumption of quality triggered by the ranking 
effectively be rebutted by counterclaims about the judicial qualities 
undetected by the Choi, Gulati, and Posner framework? It may not 
be enough that rankings will force information. They probably will. 
The question is whether the information presented in response to the 
rankings will actually be able to rebut the presumptions they create. 
We do not believe they will. 
Finally, do the measures encourage judges to act in a way that 
enhances judicial quality? If not, as we suspect, then it may be that 
the rankings will effectively undermine rather than improve judicial 
performance. 
In the end, perhaps it is best to admit that direct objective 
evaluation is difficult here and that the better alternative is to 
encourage more unabashedly agenda-driven rankings by interest 
groups like the Chamber. First, because their motivations will 
generally be clear, any weight given to these subjective rankings can 
be discounted accordingly (as long as competing rankings are 
available). Second, if a judge or court performs well across a wide 
range of interest groups, it may provide meaningful and useful insight 
about judicial quality that transcends the value of any appraisal 
offered by one study alone. 
 
